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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD C. ANDERSEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
7356

BINGHAM AND GARFIELD RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
The event, out of which this action arose, took place
and occurred at approximately 9 :00 o'clock p.m., on the
23rd day of May, 1947, at the point where defendant's
railroad track crosses U. S. Highway No. 50. The high-
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way extends in a general easterly-westerly direction and
the railroad tracks run parallel with the highway and to
the south thereof for approximately one-fourth of a mile.
The track circles to the northwest and crosses U. f:::l.
Highway No. 50 a short distanee north of Garfield, Utah
(R. 116, 117).
The ridge of mountains to the south of the tracks has
the effect of casting a dark shadow over equipment moving along the tracks at night and removing any silhouetting against the sky which mi~ht reveal the presence of
a train or other equipment on the tracks (R. 136).
Lloyd C. Andersen, a young man 23 years of age, was
driving his 1935 Plymouth Sedan in an easterly direction on U. S. Highway No. 50 from Tooele, Utah, where
he was employed as a Supply Clerk at the Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot toward Salt Lake City (R. 140, 141).
At the time he left Tooele it was dark and he was
required to use the headlights on his automobile. His last
memory of the trip toward Salt Lake City was that he
stopped at the junction of Tooele Highway and U. S.
Highway No. 50 and then proceeded in an easterly direction along U. S. Highway No. 50. (R. 144, 145 ). His
1935 automobile was in good condition prior to the
accident (R. 169).
Defendant's train, consisting of fifteen gondola type
cars, being shoved in front of a Diesel engine, was approaching the crossing traveling in a westerly and
northwesterly direction. 'rhere were no lights on the
leading car except lanterns carried by three members

of the train crew. The engineer was on the right-hand
side of the engine as it approached the crossing. As
defendant's train approached the crossing it vvas traveling at a speed of between seven and ten miles per hour
(Exhibit 11 - R. 223, 250).
It vv3:s a dark night and the engine's headlight cast
a strong beam of light over the top~ of the low gondola
cars toward the west along the foot of the mountains,
as the train proceeded toward the crossing. The illusion
thus created wa~ that the headlight was at the front of the
train and probably accounts for plaintiff's failure to
observe the cars as he approached the cro~sing (R. 129,
175).

)

At the time of the accident there were no lights or
/
automatic safety devices at the crossing; no flagman
was ~tationed there. The only warning to eastbound
traffic was a standard reflectorized cross-buck warning .
sign and a standard warning sign located approximately It € · :
·
1 i\t
417 feet to the west of the crossing.

st?

As the train neared the crossing three members of
the crew, riding on the leading car, observed the approach
of plaintiff's automobile. The position of the men on the
car is shown on Exhibit 7. After the men saw plaintiff's
automobile approaching, Paddock, the engine foreman,
in charge of the crew at the time, climbed to the top of
the leading car. (R. 225).
As plaintiff's automobile approached the crossmg
it was traveling at a speed of between thirty-one and
forty miles per hour (R. 172, 173, 184).
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Two of the trainmen waived their lanterns back and
forth endeavoring to attract plaintiff's attention. 'l'hereafter, Paddock gave the engineer a "washout" signal
(R. 225, 226). At the time Paddock gave the washout
signal the leading end of the leadin,q car w:as about three
car lengths from the railroad crossing (R. 226). A car
length is approxh1mtely thirty-five feet (R. 256).
As plaintiff's automobile approached the crossing
it appeared to the men on the leading car as though he
hesitated and then tried to go around the car (R. 230).

)

Neither witness Doty nor his wife, who were following plaintiff in their automobile, saw switchmen's lanterns on the front end of the train or were aware of the
presence of the train at the crossing until they saw the
lights on plaintiff's automobile go up in the air and then
saw the railroad cars proceeding across the crossing
(R. 174, 179, 187).
Paddock apparently was concerned over whether
rplaintiff would observe the train sometime before the
accident occurred because when the leading car was
still a considerable distance from the crossing he went
high on the leading car in order to be in a position to
give a washout signal if necessary (R. 325, 326).
Engineer Colby testified that as he approached the
crossing and the leading car started around the curve
he saw an automobile's headlights approaching from
the west, traveling east, and that as he came closer to
the crossing he observed the men on the leading car
trying to attract the driver's attention. He slotced the
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train down somewhat and tl1en attempted to bighole tlie
tra-in. Shor·tly after he bigholed t.he train he received a
washout signal from the leading end (R. 251, 252). It
was engineer Colby's opinion that the train as made up
on that evening and on that track and under the identical
circumstances at the time could have been stopped within about four car lengths had it gone into an emergency
application of the automatic air brake system at the
tirnc he attempted to bighole the train (R. 255). It will
be recalled that at the time Paddock gave the washout
signal the leading end of the leading ear was three car
lengths from the crossing and that engineer Colby had
bigholeu the train befor·e he saw the washout signal given.
It would have taken less than one second for every brake
on the train to have been placed in emergency application
had the brakes been operating properly (R. 245). The
train, however, traveled three car lengths before reaching the intersection, thirty feet across the intersection
and two hundred ten feet beyond before coming to a stop.
The train traveled approximately nine and one-half
car lengths after the brakes were applied and for two
hundred seventeen feet of that distance was shoving the
automobile sideways along the tracks and the leading
trucks of the leading car were derailed and bumping
along the ties (R. 327). If the brakes had responded
properly the train would have been completely stopped
in four to six car lengths (R. 255, 327).
~.,' ,~.,

·.~~ ;~·

.><: d'(

The automobile was demolished by the impact (R.
120- Exhibit 7). The front trucks derailed at the point of
collision (R. 229). When plaintiff's automobile came

)

to rest after the accident it was 217 feet from a point
midway in the westbound lane of traffic on U. S. Highway No. 50 which appeared to be the point of collision
(R. 119, 128- Exhibit 53).
When Doty approached the automobile and the train
after they had come to rest, the frame of the automobile
was up against the leading car (R. 176). The automobile
had been struck on the right front side approximately in
the vicinity of the front door (Exhibit 8).

".r..

The train had two braking systems, the independent
air brake system which controlled the braking mechanisms of the locomotive itself and the automatic brake
system which operated the brakes on the entire train.
Both brakes were operated by air (R. 238). The automatic air brakes were set by releasing air pressure in
the brake line (R. 242). An emergency application of
air in the automatic brake line permits all of the air to
escape immediately from the train into the atmosphere
which would cause the brakes to set on every car (R. 244).
Throughout a long train it would not take over a second
to apply every brake in the train by an emergency application. On a train consisting of 10 cars and an engine it
would take considerably less than one second to actuate
the entire braking system on the train (R. 245). If the
pressure in the automatic air brake

syst(~m

were too

low, it would be impossible for the engineer to throw
the brakes of the train into emergency application even
though he released all of the air (R. 245).
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Before the accident occurred, as Engineer Colby proceeded along the foot of the mountain on a descending
grade toward the crossing, he was required to use some
braking power to keep from going too fast (R. 249). As
he proceeded along he observed the guage in the engiw~
and noted that the air pressure in the automatic brah
system continued to lower indicating leakage in the
system (R. 249). He also observed that he could not
leave the automatic air brake in lap or neutral position very long or it would reduce the train line pressure
too much and that the leakage on this train was unusual. He kept fighting the loss of air and leakage
all the way down the hill by putting the locomotive iu
neutral and opening the throttle to speed up the cornpressors and make pressure faster (R. 281, 282). This
procedure would not have been necessary if the usual and
normal amount of leakage had been present (R. 282).
As a matter of fact, the independent air brake system
actuating the engine brakes played a large part in the
operation of the train on the evening of the accident
(R. 281). According to the Air Brake Pocket Handbook

the brake pipe leakage should not have exceeded five
pounds per minute (R. 287). On this particular train
the leakage was much greater than the five pounds per
minute authorized by the pocket handbook (R. 295 ).
When Engineer Colby attempted to bighole the
train he did not get an emergency application throughout the train (R. 252). He never did get an emergency
application (R. 254). He was certain that the train did

8
not go into emergency because the train line gauge did
not immediately go to zero but dropped down gradually ( R. 283). The reason he didn't get an emergency
application throughout the train was that the pressure
in the system was too low (R. 245).
When we consider that a fraction
of a second
... ...
would have given plaintiff sufficient time to have passed
across the intersection to safety and that the defective
brakes caused the train to be moved 91h car lengths,
217 feet of that distance shoving an automobile sideways before it, and with the front trucks of the leading
car derailed, and that the train in engineer Colby's
opinion could have been stopped within four car lengths
had an emergency application been obtained, it
is clear
··- , ....
that the cause of this accident was the defective brakes
of the train.
-·~·--

_.._.

~.-.

\;,.

"

Plaintiff was very seriously injured. He was unconscious in the hospital for seven days following the
accident (R. 146). He suffered a severe concussion of
the brain and a double compound fracture of his left
leg (R. 147). He had a Zimmer splint, consisting of
four quarter inch pins and a device holding the pins in
fixed position on his leg for approximately five days
after which the bone slipped necessitating replacement
of the splint with a spica cast covering his body from
the breast down over the right leg and half way down
on the left leg (R. 148). This cast remained in place
for approximately one month and three weeks and
thereafter another cast was placed on his body and

leg~.

The total time that

hi~

body and legs were in

casts was three and a half months (R. 150). He was
hospitalized for five months and three weeks and after
leaving the hospital was on

crutche~

for two month8

and on a cane for an additional three months (R. 152).
At the time of the trial, more than one and one half year8
after the accident, the cords and muscles in his right leg
were tied up and grown to the flesh so that he could not
flex his leg in a normal manner (R. 153). He suffered
permanent injury to his right leg and permanent injury
to the brain substance resulting from the serious concussion which he had received (R. 203, 212).
We submit that a grave miscarriage of justice was
perpetrated when the jury returned a no cause of action
verdict and that the jury's verdict ean only have resulted from confusing, misleading and erroneous instructions by the trial court as will be hereinafter discussed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1.

The Court erred m giving Instruction No. 11.

2.

The Court erred m giving Instruction No. 15.

3. The Court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 3.
4. The Court erred m overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

\

;~...
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SUMMARY O:F' ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHERE THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE IS PRESENTED AS AN ISSUE FOR
THE .JURY IT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FOR
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THAT I:F' THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURY HE CANNOT RECOVER. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, 3 and 4).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHERE THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE IS PRESENTED AS AN ISSUE FOR
THE JURY IT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FOR
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THAT IF THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURY HE CANNOT RECOVER. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, 3 and 4).

ll
JV

(a) Defendant was clearly negligent in its violation
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.

The ground of negligence relied upon by the plaintiff in submission of this case to the jury is set forth
m plaintiff's complaint as follows (R. 5) :
" (e) That prior to the time of the occurrence of the grievance, as herein set forth, the
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Congress of the United States of America passed
a law which was in full force and effect at said
time, to wit: 45 U.S.C.A. 1, which provides as
follows:

'It shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by
railroad to use on its line any locomotive
engine in moving interstate traffic not
equipped with a power driving-wheel
brake and appliances for operating the
train-brake system, or to run any train in
such traffie that has not a sufficient number of cars in it so equipped with power or
train brakes that the engineer on the locomotive drawing such train can control its
spee~L_:r.:.~g_~i.rjn_gJn-~k~~~.I?:. ~()...11se
. the commo_n lumd l;lrtJJ\:e fo~ "th!l.~. :purpose.'
That in violation of said law, defendant, at the
time and place aforesaid, negligently, recklessly
and carelessly operated in interstate commerce the
said engine and string of fifteen gondola cars
equipped with brakes that would not, and could
not, retard or control the speed of said train when
operated by the engineer in the usual and ordinary manner, and that because of the inefficiency
and inadequacy of said brakes the engineer was
unable to retard or decrease the speed of the train
or bring it to a stop when to do so would have
averted the accident with resultant injuries to
plaintiff as herein alleged."
This case was originally removed to the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, because of the allegation heretofore set forth
(R. 16, 17, 18, 24). Thereafter, the case was tried m
the United States District Court for the District of

/
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Utah, Central Division, and a verdict returned in plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff, however, being dissatisfied with
the verdict, appealed to the United States Court ol'
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the ground and for
the reason that the case was wrongfully removed to
the Federal Court. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit at 109 Fed. ( 2d) 328 reversed the
judgment with directions to remand the case to the
state court, and stated as follows:
"The allegations in the complaint charging
as an element of negligence failure on the part
of the defendant to comply with the exactions of
the Safety Appliance Act merely tendered the issue of fact whether the train was operated without brakes being in operative condition as required
by the Act. The complaint did not present any
issue or controversy in respect to the validity,
construction, or effect of the Act. It did not set
forth any right or immunity which would be supported if the Act be given one construction or
effect and defeated if given another. While the
pertinent provisions of the Act lurked in the
background as creating a duty the breach of which
constituted negligence, the right of action available and the incidents of such right of action
sprang from the law of Utah. It did not arise
under the laws of the United States. Minneapolis,
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. v. Popplar, supra; Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway
Co., supra; Gilvray v. Cuyahoya Valley Railway
Co., supra; Fairport, Painesville & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Meredith, supra; Tipton v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., supra. Therefore, the cause was not removable.''
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The Safety Appliance Act clearly imposes a duty
on carriers by railroad in interstate commerce for the
protection of travelers on the public highways.
In the case of FairpoTt, P. Jl; E. R. Co. v. Meredith,
292 U. S. 589, 54 S. Ct. 826, 828, (decided ,J nne 4, 1934),
it was contended that the Federal Safety Appliance Aet
was intended only for the proteetion of railroad employees and passengers and that its protection did not
extend to travelers upon public highways. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that Congress, by the
enactment of the F'ederal Safety Appliance Act, provided protection to travelers upon public highways as
well as to railroad employees and passengers. The Court
stated:

'' * * • To confine the beneficial effect of
these provisions to employees and passengers
would be to impute to Congress an intention to
ignore the equally important element which their
enactment actually contributes to the safety of
travelers at highway crossings. Since all of these
three classes of persons are within the mischief
at which the provisions are aimed, it is quite reasonable to interpret the statute imposing the duty
as including all of them.''
See also Brady v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 303
U. S. 10, 58 S. Ct. 426.
The Safety Appliance Act imposes an absolute and
continuing duty on interstate carriers by. railroad
·~aE;-tain the automatic air brake systems on trains in
proper and efficient condition.

-to.
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Roberts' Federal Liabilities of Carriers, Vol. 2 (2d
Ed.) discusses the absolute character of the carriers duty
in maintaining safe and efficient brake systems on their
trains and locomotives :
"Sec. 597. Tests of compliance with Act. The
statute requires, not only that a train be equipped
with the prescribed minimum percentage of power-braked cars, but also that all power-braked
cars in the train which are associated together
with such minimum 'shall have their brakes so
used and operated.' * * * The test of compliance
with the requirement that the power-braked cars
of the train 'shall have their brakes so used and
operated' seems, under the authorities, to be
whether the train-brake system as a whole was
capable of efficient use and operation at the time
in question. Equipment of the train with a power-brake system conforming to the standard set
by the Act is not enough. It must also meet
and respond to the test of actual u.se. It must
give the engineer efficient control of the train."
(Italics ours.)
"Sec. 656. Duty under Safety Ap!pliance Act.
Whatever grounds there may have been for entertaining a contrary view, it is now settled that the
Federal Safety Appliance Act imposes an absolute
and unqualified duty, upon the carriers subject to
its terms, to provide and maintain the equipment
specified by its provisions and by the orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated by its authority. As to the installation and
maintenance of the equipment required by the act
and these orders, an absolute duty rests upon the
carrier, and neither ignorance of the fact of noncompliance, nor bona fide and diligent efforts to

15
prevent it, will exonerate the carrier from responsibility for the consequences of the default.
'' 'The Congress,' said the national Supreme
Court in a pioneer case construing this statue, 'not
satisfied with the common-law duty and its resulting liability, has prescribed and defined the duty
by statute. We have nothing to do but to ascertain
and declare the meaning of a few simple words in
which the duty is described. It is enacted that
'no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used
in interstate traffic which do not comply with
the standard.' There is no escape from the meaning of these words. Explanation cannot clarify
them and ought not to be employed to confuse
them or lessen their significance. The obvious pur- \
pose of the legislature was to supplant the qualified duty of the common law with an absolute
duty deemed by it more just."
/ ____,
J\

The absolute liability created by the Safety Appliance Act is sufficiently established by evidence which
proves that the equipment challenged has performed in
an inefficient manner. See Didinger v .. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 39 F. (2d) 798, (6 C.C.A., Apr. 7, 1930); Lehigh
Valley R. Co. v. Howell, 6 F. (2d) 784; Anderson v.
Chesa1peake &: 0. R. Co., 186 N. E. 185, certiorari denied,
54 S. Ct. 93, 78 L. Ed. 583.
In the case of Spokane &: I.E.R. Co . v. Campbell,
241 U. S. 497, 60 L. Ed. 1125, 36 S. Ct. 683, the United
States Supreme Court interpreted Sections 1 and 9 of
the Federal Safety Appliance Act as imposing upon a,
railroad a mandatory and absolute duty of maintaining
the air brakes on interstate trains in a state of proper
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repair so that they can be efficiently operated. In that
case the plaintiff, an engineer, was injured when the
air brakes on the train he was operating did not holcl
and a head-on collision with another train resulted. 'l'he
pertinent portions of the Court's opinion are as follows:
"It is insisted that there \Vas no evidence
that the provision of the Safety Appliance Act
respecting train brakes was violated. It is of
course settled that if the equipment was in fact
defective or out of repair, the question whether
this was attributable to the company's negligence is immaterial. St. Louis & C. Ry. v. Taylor,
210 U. S. 281, 294 (21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464); Chicago & C. Ry. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559,
575; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, ante, pp. 33, 43.
Hence the argument is that, according to all of
the evidence, the equipment was not defective
or out or repair. It appeared without dispute
that it consisted of the Westinghouse standard
automatic air brake, such as is in general use
throughout the country upon passenger trains.
A witness in defendant's employ testified that
shortly before Campbell took the train out from
Coeur d'Alene on the trip in question he inspected the air brakes and found them in perfect
order. But there was much evidence besides that
of Campbell himself to the effect that when he
applied the emergency the brakes took hold and
then leaked off so as to release the brakes. The
jury was warranted in finding from the testimony &S a whole that Campbell properly applied
the air when 600 feet or more from the place
where the collision occurred, and that the brakes
refused to work. Expert witnesses called by defendant testified in effect that the train could
have been stopped inside of 300 feet if the
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brakes had been in proper order. The air brake
equipment was wrecked in the collision, so that
there was no explanation of the cause of its
failure to operate properly; but it was a reasonable inference that there was some defect or want
of repair in the valves or packing."
As has been clearly demonstrated by the authorities cited, the test of compliance lies in the performance' of the applian0e. The existence of negligence in
the sense of failure to use care is immaterial and the
principle of res ipsa loquitur applies. There can be no
doubt of the failure of the brakes in defendant's train
to function in a normal, proper and efficient manner.
Had the brakes gone into emergency when the engineer
made th·e "bighole" application, the train would have
stopped within four car lengths (R. 255). However, the
brakes, due to. their inefficiency, did not go into emergency ~a;d--~~~·~~quentiy·-·the. ~~girceer was unable to
stop the train in less tha11_ nine and a hal(_c;ar le11gth.s.

It was the engineer's opinion that the reason the train
brakes failed and did not go into emergency was that
the air had leaked out of the brake line due to an excessive number of leaks in the train system.
The evidence is clear and undisputed that the Fed- \ ·.,
eral Safety Appliance Act was violated; that this vio\
lation rendered an emergency application of brakes in
\
the train impossible and that this negligent act was the '
direct cause of plaintiff's injuries, damage and loss.

The doctrine of last cleaT chance u•as clearly )!I
applicable in this case.
fI
(b)

\
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Plaintiff was traveling along an unlighted highway
on a dark night. Defendant was shoving fifteen cars
along the base of an abrupt range of mountains. The
dark silhouette of the mountains enshrouded the track
and tended to conceal the train as it approached the
crossing. The unlighted gondola ears on the front end
of the train circled a~way from the mountain toward the
crossing; the light beams from the headlight of the
locomotive were thrown westerly along the base of the
mountains. There were no flashing lights or other warning devices, no flagman at the crossing., Unql_les~ionabl¥,
the illusion existed that the engine was at the head of
t~train.

Defendant's negligence in moving upon and over
its tracks a train equipped with inefficient and inadequate air brakes continued up to and including the very
moment of the occurrence. The engineer had adequate
and sufficient time within which to have avoided the
accident had the brakes performed properly and efficiently.
It will be recalled that the train could have been
stopped within four car lengths had it gone into an
emergency application of the air brake system at the
time Colby attempted to "bighole" the train (R. 255).
Paddock gave the "washout" signal at a time when the
leading car was three car lengths from the crossing and
the engineer had "bigholed" the train before the washout signal was given. It would have taken less than
one second for every brake in the train to have been
placed in emergency application had the air brakes oper-

-
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ated properly. The train, however, traveled nine and
a half instead of four car lengths and carried an automobile sideways down the tracks a distance of 217 feet
at a time when the leading trucks of the leading gondola
car were derailed. When it is recalled that the automobile was struck on its side by the front end of the leading gondola ear and that. a _split second would have saved
~~:-.)zlain~iH harmles~, there--;-:;;;I;;-ITttle question but
that defendant's continuing neglect in moving a train
equipped with inefficient and inadequate air brakes
along its track was superimposed upon the condition
into which plaintiff had placed himself and became the
primary efficient cause of his injuries.
In the case of Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 P. 92, 93 (decided Feb. 19, 1898),
it appeared that decedent, a deaf and dumb mute minor
child, 15 years of age, was crossing the tracks of the
defendant on an angle with his back toward defendant's
approaching car; that the operator observed the boy,
rang the bell and then, observing that the bell did not
attract his attention, attempted to stop the car, but
failed and the car struck the boy, carrying him a distance
of about 58 feet before stopping. The evidence was that
the rear brake of the car was loose, and kicked off; that
the brakes on the car were not in good condition and
had not been in good condition for some time; that
electric shocks from the brakes were frequent, and that
when the operator of the car turned off the power, intending to reverse the car, an electric shock from the
brakes prevented his doing so until after the accident

1(
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had occurred. The operator of the car testified that
if the brakes had been in good repair he could have
stopped by reversing in about eight feet. The trial court
submitted the case to the jury on the basis of the doctrine of last clear chance. 'l'his ruling was affirmed on
appeal in the following language:

'' * * * If the defendant knowingly placed in
operation upon the public street a defective car,
that could not be controlled because the appliances provided for that purpose were out of repair, and the injury complained of was occasioned by such defective brakes and appliances,
and the motorman was unable to avoid the effect of the contributory negligence of the de. ceased, because of such defects, then it would
properly be said that the defendant's negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury."
In the case of Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S .. L. R.
Co., (decided May 9, 1907), 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402, 408,
409, decedent, a licensee on defendant's railroad track,
stepped in front of a backing train, consisting of an
engine, tender, mail car, and baggage car. He was
struck by the baggage car and thrown between the rails.
No part of the train injured him until he was struck
by the firebox of the engine, which rolled, dragged and
crushed him to death. The brakeman on the end of the
baggage car gave signals to the engineer to stop as soon
as decedent was struck, but was unable to attract the
engineer's attention. Another witness ran along th~
track on the fireman's side of the train and attempted
to attract his attention, but was unable to do so. There
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was evidence that decedent was alive until struck by
the firebox, and that had the brakes been applied immediately after decedent was first struck, the train
could have been stopped before the firebox reached him.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant,
and the Supreme Court of Utah reversed on the ground
that the case should have been submitted to the jury
under the doctrine of last clear chance. rrhe Court
stated:

" * * * rrhis court, in harmony with the great
weight of authority, seems to be committed to
the rule (when the injured or deceased person
was not a trespasser) that the defendant's act
of negligence will be regarded as the sole proximate cause of the injury, not only when relating
to a breach of duty occurring after the consequences of contributory negligence have been discovered, but also when, in the exercise of ordinary care, such consequences could have been disdiscovered, if a breach of du,ty intervened or continued after the commission of the contributory
negligence. While the breach of duty must be
subsequent to the commission of the contributory negligence, yet such breach of duty may
be before, as well as after, the discovery of the
peril. This principle of law has often been illustrated by cases where the owner of stock was
guilty of negligence in permitting it to stray
upon the railroad track, and where the liability
of the company was made to depend, not only
upon the question of whether the train operatives
could have avoided the injury after the animal
was discovered on or near the track, but also
whether, in the exercise of ordinary care, the train
operatives could or ought to have discovered it in
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time to have avoided the injury. So also in cases
where one was guilty of negligence in the first
instance in going upon the track and by reason
of being caught in a frog, or was otherwise rendered unable to escape, and where the railroad
company was held liable, not only for an omission of duty on the part of the train operatives
after discovering the peril, but also for an omission of duty in not discovering it. In such cases
the contributory negligence is deemed the remote, and the defendant's negligence the proximate cause of the injury. Such is the principle
of law which seems to have been announced by
this court in the case of Hall v. Railway Co., 13
Utah, 243, 44 Pac. 1046, 57 Am. St. Rep. 726, and
in the case of Shaw v. City R. R. Co., 21 Utah
77, 59 Pac. 552, and is the principle of law stated
in the instruction which this court approved,
and which was involved in the question decided
by the court, in the case of Thompson v. Salt
Lake Rapid Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac.
92, 40 L.R.A. 172, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621, and is
well illustrated in Inland & Seaboard Coasting
Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 557, 11 Sup. Ct. 653,
35 L. Ed. 270, and in Grand Truck Ry. Co. v.
Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed.
485."
In Bunker v. Union Pac. R. Co., (decided Mar. 15,
1911), 38 Utah 575, 114 P. 764, 775, plaintiff, an employee of defendant railroad company, brought action
to recover for injuries alleged to have resulted from the
neglect of the railroad company in failing to have and
maintain efficient brakes on the engine of the train. The
jury found the issues in favor of the defendant and the

plaintiff appealed, citing as error, among other things,
the failure to instruct adequately on the doctrine of
last clear chance. The appellate court affirmed, holding
that the jury had been sufficiently instructed on the
doctrine, but also holding that the doctrine was applicable. Mr. Justice Straup, in his special concurrence,
stated:

'' * * * On the other hand, it is and was contended by appellant that the braking appliances
were defective, and that there is sufficient evidence to justify a finding to that effect; and
though the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in
going upon or falling from the pilot, still there
is sufficient evidence to show that immediately
after he fell the head brakeman gave to the engineer a stop signal which was seen by the engineer, who immediately attempted to stop the
train, but was, on account of the defective appliances, unable to do so until the train had traveled
a distance of SO to 100 feet; and that the serious
injury to the appellant - the mangling of his
arm, requiring its amputation - was caused at
the place where his arm was wedged in between
the rails by the wheels of the engine or cars
there running over it, or by being wedged between the rails. I think there is sufficient evidence to support such a theory of the appellant,
and, had such facts been found in his favor, I
think he would have been entitled to recover.
Thompson v. Rapid Transit Co., 16 Utah 281,
52 Pac. 92, 40 L.R.A. 172, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621;
Teakle v. S., P. L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah
276, 90 Pac. 402, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 486."

See also Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., (decided
Feb. 19, 1908), 14 Idaho 327, 94 P. 432, 438, where the
Court stated:

'' • * * The negligence of the deceased, if the
jury should find that there was such negligence,
becomes remote if it should be found that the
motorman could have prevented the accident by
having his car under proper control at said street
crossing, or by lowering the fender on the car
he could have prevented the serious consequences
of the accident. The street car company owes a
duty to the pedestrian, and must run its cars
with due care in order to avoid doing him injury.
While we regard rapid transit as indispensable
in this rushing age, we do not esteem it of greater
value than life and limb, and it must be conducted with due care for the rights of others.
Justice and humanity will not countenance the
doctrine that a street railway company may,
without liability, run down and maim or kill a
human being who may have carelessly placed
himself, unconsciously or otherwise, in a position
to be injured or killed, simply because he was
careless or negligent in placing himself in such
position.''
It is true that the trial court endeavored to submit
the issue of last clear chance to the jury in Instruction
No. 12. However, as will be hereinafter pointed out the
effect of Instruction No. 12 was completely minimized
and rendered to no avail because of instructions on
contributory negligence given by the trial court.

(c) The trial court committed reversible error when
) it instructed the jury that contributory negli_qence on

the part of the plaintiff would be a complete bar to his
recovery. (Assignment of Errors No. 1, 2, 3 and 4).
This case was tried and submitted on the doctrine
of the last clear chance. It is a well-established principle of law that contributory negligence is immaterial
where the last clear chance doctrine is applicable. Vol.
38 Am. Jur. p . .900, ,par. 215 of Title Negligence, states

the principle as follows:
''The doctrine of last clear chance, otherwise
known as the doctrine of discovered peril, as the
doctrine of supervening negligence, and, less frequently, as the humanitarian doctrine, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclued a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant by exercising reasonable care and prudence might have avoided injurious consequences
to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence. The practical import of the doctrine
is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who
has been grossly negligent in :placing himself in
peril, if the defendant, aware of the plaintiff's
peril, or, according to some but not all authorities, although unaware of the plaintiff's peril,
reasonably in the exercise of due care should
have been aware of it, had in fact a later opportunity than the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third
person which is imputed to his opponent, is con-
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sidered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.''
In other words, a negligent defendant 1s held liable
to a negligent plaintiff where the defendant has the
last clear chance of avoiding accidental injury to the
plaintiff.
In the leading Utah case of Graham v. Johnson et
al., ________ Utah ________ , 166 P. (2d) 230, 235, the following
fact situation was presented: Plaintiff, age 13, was
playing football in the street with two playmates, age
14 and 12. Defendant drove her automobile along the
street where plaintiff and his playmates were playing
and observed them at play. Shortly after driving along
the street she returned and drove past them again. On
the second occasion of her driving past them she saw
the plaintiff standing near the center of the street with
his back to her car. Just before she reached the position where plaintiff was standing, one of his playmates
shouted, "Gary, look out." Upon hearing the shout
plaintiff started to run at an angle in front of the car
driven by defendant and was injured. 'l'he trial court
at the conclusion of the case directed a verdict for the
defendant on the theory that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the
doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable. The
Supreme Court on appeal reversed and remanded for
a new trial.
"What we have really been considering is a
rather unique application of the so-called last
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clear chance doctrine. Our discussion has dealt
with a negligent omission of Darlene in not timely
sounding her horn - an omission actuated by a
worthy motive but which the jury could nevertheless find to be negligence. It has also been
conceded that the boys were negligent in that
they were in violation of the ordinance against
playing in the street which ordinance was designed for their protection as well as for the
expedition of traffic. Why then in this case does
not the negligence of plaintiff bar recovery even
though Darlene was negligent~ The reason lies
in the fact that in this situation the so-called
humanitarian doctrine of last clear chance applies.

"In Chapter 17, Sees. 479 and 480 of Vol.
II, Restatement of Torts, the last clear chance
doctrine is stated in regard to two situations.
Sec. 479 dealt with a situation where a plaintiff
has been negligent in getting himself in a situation from which he cannot extricate himself
or in getting himself in a condition where he cannot by alertness avoid the danger in which defendant subsequently puts him, example being when
a man goes to sleep on a railroad track or gets
his foot caught in a frog. In either case the point
has been passed where 'lie . could bY" a:Iertn.ess
··avoid ·the danger of the oncoming tr~in. ··Sec.
480 deals with the situation where the plaintiff
was inattentive but had the ability, had he been
alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to which
the defendant was subjecting him. But in both
cases the liability of the defendant arose because
he failed to take the opportunity whis;_~ __he___ q],_Q!l~
-~ timely to avoid doing the plaintiff harm
even though the plaintiff was negligent in get-
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ting himself i1~ a position where he was helpless
or because he was so inattentive that he was not
alert to the approaching danger over which defendant had control.. And in both cases to hold
the defendant liable it must plainly (l!,pvpear to
the jury that defendant knew or reasonably
should have known of plaintiff's helpless peril
or of his inattention and after such rcali.zation
or after he reasonably, had he been conducting
himself with the vigilance required of him, should
have known it, 'is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his then
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.'
In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's negligence has become in a sense fixea[£nd realiz(Jbl,,e
~:a;:n;(ron ·to this state of things '"'defendant approaches on to the negligent plaintiff with and
in control of the danger."
The Supreme Court granted rehearing at the instance of defendant to clarify itt; opinion and in a
supplementary opinion at 172 P. (2) GG8, dii'enH;.;ing
the doctrine of last clear chance and its relatiom;hip
to plaintiff's negligence stated:

" * * * The situation must be such that plaintiff is in a position of peril from defendant's
operation either beca1tse plaintiff is inattentive
or unaware of danger and thus negligent, or because he cannot extricate himself f1"0m a position
of peru'fido which his negligence projected him.
''To revert to the instant case: Darlene was
cognizant of Gary's inattention and his unawareness that she was approaching. He was negligent in being where he was. She had ample opportunity to warn him and put him on attention.
To do this timely the jury could find was a duty
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which she owed to the plaintiff even in spite of
his negligence and du.e to his situation. The jury
could find that she omitted to perform her duty.
What must she anticipate as a natural consequence of her omission~ She must anticipate
that if she is seemingly placing Gary in increasing peril someone may be reasonably inspired
automatically to warn him and that in response
to the stimulus of that warning, he would or
might naturally seek safety by running. What
might be called the automatic chain stems from
her omission timely to sound a warning. Nothing
in this automatic chain is an independent superseding cause. The situation we are exposing is
one where the chain of consequences due to failure to do that which the clear chance dictates, is
automatic or semi-automatic - a causation chain
as in the well known 'Squibb' case, stemming
from the act of negligence of the defendant which
was an omission to do what a prudent person
would have done to avoid the accident when
there was a clear opportunity to do so. That
omission may have been defendant's only act
of negligence but it is on one level and the plaintiff's on another level. The plaintiff's negligence
was continuing but static. The defendant, who
was controlling and operating the agency of approaching danger, had the clear chance to avoid
the effect of the other's negligence and did not
not do so. That was her negligence and it came
after the plaintiff's negligence had become known
and fixed.''
It is to be noted that this court in the Graham case
recognizes clearly that the doctrine of last clear chance
is applicable either where plaintiff is in a position of
:peril because he is inattentive, or unaware of danger

30
and thus negligent, or where he cannot extricate himself from a position of peril into which his negligence
has projected him. In the former situation plaintiff's
negligence is continuing right to the point of the accident,
but the defendant, who is controlling and operating the
agency of approaching danger, has the clear chance to
avoid the effect of the others negligence and does not
do so.
In the case of Locke v. Puget Sound International
Ry. cf; Power Co., 100 Wash. 432, 171 P. 242, L.R.A.
1919D 1119, it appeared that plaintiff was riding a
tricycle in a diagonal direction along a highway across
certain streetcar tracks and that the streetcar was approaching from his rear. Plaintiff's negligence was continuing up to the point of the accident. The court, in
holding tha:t plaintiff's negligence under these circumstances was not a bar to his recovery, stated:
"But the continued movement of a person
toward a place of danger after a warning sound
is notice that he is unaware of his peril, and is
enough to break the reciprocal balance of duty,
and, if it can be said that he had the time to do
so, puts upon the motorman the positive duty
of avoiding an accident."
In the case of Harrington et al. v. Los Angeles Ry.
Co . , 140 Cal. 514, 74 P. 15, it appeared that deceased
was killed in a collision with a streetcar while he was
riding in a bicycle race as part of a Fourth of July
celebration. At the time of his injury he was violating
a city ordinance limiting the speed of bicycles and was
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.found as a matter of law to be g·uilty of contributory
negligence. As he and other participants in the bicycle
race were approaching the intersection, the evidence
indicated that the motorman observed the concourse of
vehicles approaching. He also observed quite a number
of individuals witnessing the bicycle race.
"Ordinarily, the person operating the car has
the right to assume that the one so approaching
is able to and will care for himself, by taking
all necessary precautions to observe the approach
of the car, and that he will not place himself on
the track at such a time as to be injured thereby.
But no such assumption could be held to be
justified under the peculiar circumstances already stated."
In the Harrington case it is clear and indisputable
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
which continued right to the point of the accident. However, because of his inattention and because the motorman was in possession and control of the instrumentality
of danger and had the last clear opportunity of avoiding the accident plaintiff's negligence was not a bar
to his recovery.
In this case the trial court in Instruction No. 4
defined contributory negligence as follows:

"b. 'Contributory negligence' means that a
person injured has proximately contributed to
such injury by his want of ordinary care, so that
except for such want of ordinary care on his part
the injury would not have resulted;''
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In Instruction No. 9 the trial court instructed the
jury in part as follows :
''If you should find that the brakes were defective, still, in order to reach a verdict for
plaintiff, you must, in addition, find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
By this is meant not just a possibility; it must
have been a clear opportunity.''

By this language the jury is clearly instructed that only
where the defendant had the last clear chance to have
avoided injury to the plaintiff would plaintiff be able
to recover.
The Court, m Instruction No. 11, instructed the
jury in part as follows:
''If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff failed to conform to
any of the aforementioned duties which the law
imposes upon him, that would constitute negligence on his part, and, if he was thus negligent,
and you further find from a preponderance of
the evidence that such negligence proximately
caused, or contributed to cause his own injury,
then he can not recover.''
In Instruction No. 11 no mention is made of the last
clear chance theory of liability whatsoever. Th~"jury
is not instructed that even should they find plaintiff
negligent he would be entitled to recover if the defendant had the last clear chance to have avoided the accident had it not been for the condition of the train's
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brakes. The jury is told in explicit, uncomprom1smg
language that contributory negligence on the part of
plaintiff would defeat his recovery. There is no room
in such language for an exception if the last clear chance
doctrine applies. Of course, in Instruction No. 12 the
court instructs the jury in part upon the doetrine of
last clear chance.
''Even though an injured party, through his
own negligence, placed himself in a position of
peril, he may, nevertheless, recover if the one
who injured him discovers, or by the exercise of
ordinary care, should have discovered him and
have avoided the injury.
''Although you may find from the evidence
that plaintiff was negligent as he approached
said crossing, if you find from a preponderance
of the evidence that the air-brakes were defective,
and that the defendant, by using ordinary care
under the circumstances, could have discovered
plaintiff's peril and avoided the collision if the
air-brakes had not been defective, then, under
those circumstances, negligence on the part of
the plaintiff would not bar his right to recover in
this case. ''
But who is to say which instruction was followed by
the jury~ Instruction No. 11 where it is said that negligence on the part of plaintiff is a complete bar to his
recovery, or Instruction No. 12 where plaintiff's negligence is said not to be a complete bar where the last
clear chance situation exists? Again in Instruction No.
15 the court in uncompromising, positive and unequivocal language sets forth the proposition that negligence
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on the part of the plaintiff would bar his recovery.
Again no reference whatsoever is made to a situation
where his contributory negligence would not bar recovery, i.e., the last clear chance situation.
''If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent, and that
the plaintiff was also negligent, and that the negligence of the plaintiff proximately caused or contributed to cause his own injury and damage, then
the plaintiff cannot recover. In other words, if
both parties were guilty of negligent conduct, and
the negligence of the plaintiff himself caused or
contributed to cause his own injury, then he can
not recover, even though the defendant may have
been guilty of negligence which also proximately
contributed to the injury to such plaintjff.

"The law does not permit the jury to weigh
the degree of negligence of the parties, where the
negligence of both plaintiff and defendant concur
to cause the injury."
Again we ask which instruction did the jury follow,
Instruction 12 or Instruction No. 15 °? w-e submit that
Instruction No. 11 and Instruction No. 15 complete! y
and effectively abrogate and render to no avail the
entire doctrine of the last clear chance.
The fundamental error into which the trial court
has fallen is its assumption that if plaintiff's negligence
continued and coincided in point of time with that of
defendant, plaintiff could not recover. That is clearly
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not the law under the fact situation presented by this
case. In Instruction No. 15 the court has said:
"The law does not permit the jury to weigh
the degree of negligence of the parties, where the
negligence of both plaintiff and defendant concur
to cause the injury."
As the court said in the Graham case :
"That omission may have been defendant's only
act of negligence but it is on one level and the
plaintiff's on another level. T.he plaintiff's neggligence was continuing but static. The defendant, who was controlling and operating the agency
of approaching danger, had the clear chance to
avoid the effect of the other's negligence and did
not do so."'
The doctrine of last clear chance is sometimes
spoken of as the humanitarian doctrine. That name was
applied because of the very fact that plaintiff's contributory negligence, even though it may have continued down
to and coincided in point of time with defendant's negligence, nevertheless would not preclude him from recovering where the defendant had the last clear opportunity of
avoiding the accident and did not do so.
In Instruction No. 11 the violation of duty which
the court states would bar plaintiff's recovery was his
failure to use his senses of sight and hearing and to keep
a lookout ahead and to keep his car under safe control
and to drive at a speed which was reasonable and prudent.
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Any one or more of the acts of negligence set forth
m the instruction acts as a complete bar to recovery.
Instruction No. 15 generally states that contributory
negligence will bar recovery. As has been pointed out,
contributory negligence under the fact situation of this
case would not and could not act as a bar to recovery
if the jury believed that the plaintiff was in a position
of peril because of inattention even though his inattention and consequent negligence continued right on t,)
the point of collision.
In Bisogno v. New York Rys. Co. 194 App. Div.
316, 185 N. Y. Supp. 411, 412, there was evidenee that
a boy nine years old, playing on the street, was walking
on the railroad track in plain sight of the motorman
while the car was traveling at least 100 feet, and that
the motorman did not slacken his speed or ring his bell,
and that after the car hit the boy it proceeded 100 feet
before it was stopped. vVith this evidence in mind at
the close of the case the Court charged the jury in the
following language:
"The Court: 'I shall not charge it in that
way. I will charge it in this way: That if the
situation at the time of or just before the accident, as between the car and the boy, was such
that the accident could have been avoided if the
motorman had used reasonable care and diligence,
then that would justify the jury in finding the
defendant had been negligent. I will say further:
One may put himself in a dangerous position,
an imprudent position, with respect to another;
but, if the danger can be avoided by reasonable
diligence on the part of that other, it stands to

reason that he has no right to bring on the accident by failing to exercise that diligence.' ''
Thereafter, however, upon request of counsel for the
defendant the Court made the following charge:
" 'Now, that there may be no mistake on the
part of the jurors as to what your honor means,
in response to the request made by plaintiff's
counsel, I understand your honor to charge that
the negligence of the motorman can be established
by the fact that the boy was in a place so dangerous, so far ahead of him, that with the exercise
of reasonable care he could have stopped; but
will your honor also charge the jury that that
does not entitle the plaintiff to a verdict - that
if both were negligent, both the boy and the
~iriotorman, there cannot be any recovery?
'' 'The Court : I so charge.
" '(Plaintiff's Counsel) : I except to that.' "
The Supreme Court of New York had squarely before it the same problem that is before this Court.
There was an instruction on the doctrine of last clear
chance and another instruction to the effect that contributory negligence would bar recovery on the part of
the plaintiff. The trial court recognized the prejudice
existing where two contrary and antagonistic instructions are given to the jury, one containing the doctrine
of last clear chance, and the other contributory negligence as a bar to recovery, and stated :
''That was the last word to the jury, and
completely annulled and wiped out and destroyed
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the previously quoted charge, made at the request
of the plaintiff's counsel. _In other words, the
case was finally submitted to the jury on the
plain doctrine that contributory negligence would
prevent a recovery. In my opinion that was
. error, and of such a character as requires reversal of this judgment. The doctrine of a last
clear chance has been fre'quently applied in this
state."

* •

• * *

" • * * But, if he did negligently go upon the
track so far ahead of this car as might have been
found by the evidence that he did, the doctrine
of the last clear chance to my mind is applicable,
and that if, seeing him in that position, the motorman had used ordinary care, the accident would
not have occurred. That issue being presented
by the evidence, the court having correctly
charged the doctrine, and then upon the inducement of the defendant's attorney having destroyed it, an error of law is presented which
we cannot overlook."

/

The New York Court of Appeals supported the Supreme Court of the State of New York and affirmed
the Bisogno decision in 135 N. E. 947, 233 N. Y. 629.
This opinion responds to logic and reason, for negligence on the part of the plaintiff will not under any
circumstances preclude him from recovering damagPs
if the defendant might, by the exercise of care on his
part, have avoided the consequences of the negligence
or carelessness on the part of the plaintiff. There may
be mutual negligence, and yet one party have a right

of action against the other if the other party had the

last clear chance to have avoided the accident. See
Mallard v. Ninth Avenue Railroad Co., 15 Daly, 376,
7 N.Y. Supp. 666, cited in the Bisogno case, and that, of
course, is the very error into which the trial court fell
in this case when it stated in Instruction No. 15 that
if both parties were guilty of negligent conduct which
contributed to cause plaintiff's injury then he could not
recover.
In the case of Michigan City v. Werner, (Ind. dec.
1916) 114 N. E. 636, 186 Ind. 149, the plaintiff was
crossing a bridge when it was raised by the bridge tender. Defendant requested an instruction that the jury
should find for the defendant if plaintiff was negligent in entering upon the bridge in an attempt to cross it.
This instruction was refused by the trial court for the
reason that contributory negligence is not a defense
where the last clear chance situation exists and that it
is improper and erroneous for a court to instruct the
jury that contributory negligence will bar recovery unless the jury is at the same time and as an explicit
qualification of that instruction instructed that if the
defendant had the last clear chance to have avoided
the accident and injuries then plaintiff's negligence
would not bar recovery and plaintiff would be entitled
to a verdict. The Court stated:
''Instruction No. 4, refused by the court, if
given, would have been in conflict with instruction No. 7, which properly states the law.

1r
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The instruction refused directed the jury, in
effect, to find for the defendant if it appeared
that the plaintiff was negligent in entering upon
the bridge in an attempt to cross it. Under the
doctrine of last clear chance, as stated in instruction No. 7, to the effect that if the injury to
the plaintiff was immediately caused by the negligence of the bridge tender after he became
aware of the dangerous situation of plaintiff
and to his failure to use ordinary care to avoid
injury to him, then the plaintiff was entitled to
recover notwithstanding his prior negligence in
entering upon the bridge."
In 64 C. J. Sec. 600, it is stated:

"It is proper to refuse, and error to give
conflicting and contradictory instructions, since
a charge containing two distinct propositions
conflicting with each other tends so to confuse
the jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent verdict, the jury cannot be required to determine what part of a contradictory charge is
correct, or left to reconcile conflicting principles
of law; it ordinarily cannot be determined from
the verdict which rule was adopted by the jury,
the court is left in doubt and uncertainty as to
the facts actually found by the jury as a basis
for its verdict, and where instructions are inconsistent with, or contradict, each other, it is usually impossible to say whether the jury were
controlled by the one or the other.''
We submit that the court's instructions on last
clear chance and on contributory negligence were conflicting and irreconcilable.

I
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Courts have held under many circumstances that
giVmg of conflicting instructions constitutes reversible
error.
In Atlantic Co. et al. v. Roberts, 179 Va. 669, 20
S. E. (2d) 520, it appeared that the fact situation warranted an instruction on unavoidable accident. One of
the instructions was to the effect that if plaintiff was
free from fault the jury could find the issues in favor
of plaintiff and against the defendant. The court held
that the giving of the instruction under the facts of this
particular case without qualifying it by setting forth
the unavoidable accident situation was reversible error. The Court stated:
"Instruction No. 3 is erroneous in that it
makes no reference to an unavoidable accident,
but would allow recovery if the jury simply found
the plaintiff free of fault. This instruction is
thus in conflict with and vitiates instruction "G",
given on behalf of the defendants, which is m
the following language:
'' 'The court instructs the jury that if you
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
injured as a result of an unavoidable accident,
then your verdict must be for the defendant.' "
We believe the situation presented by the Roberts
case is clearly analagous to the case at bar. Here the fact
situation presented a jury question on last clear chance.
To instruct ... th~_t..__c()_I1txibut9ry
_gggJigen~e was a bar to
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senting the last clear chance situation as an exception
- --- -- -

'\V:as-Cleariy ~rron~~~~---'-~_..-----~-----

In Kuether v. Kansas City Light J'; Power Co., (Mo.)
276 S. W. 105, 109, the court held that instructing the
jury in a situation where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was properly applicable that they had no right to
presume negligence if the evidence did not preponderate
in favor of the plaintiff, would have been reversible error.
The Court stated:
"Defendant directs another charge of error
against the action of the court in refusing defendant's proferred instruction D5, where it was
sought to tell the jury that they have 'no right
to presume negligence, and, if the evidence does
not preponderate in favor of plaintiff, then your
verdict should be for the defendant.' 'l'his is contradictory of, and in conflict with, plaintiff's instructions 1 and 2, which we hold properly included the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
instruction of defendant was properly refused.''
See also Oettinger v .. Stewart, (Cal. 1943), 137 P. (:2) 8G2.
In Thomas v. Stott (Mo.) 114 S. W. (2d) 142, 144,

a situation is presented which is the reverse of the case
at bar. The court found that there was a fact situation
presented in which the jury could find that plaintiff's
negligence was the sole negligence in the case and held
that instructing the jury that contributory negligence
does not defeat recovery under the humanitarian doctrine without also instructing that the sole negligence
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of the plaintiff would defeat recovery was error. The
Court stated:
''While contributory negligence does not defeat recovery under the humanitarian doctrine,
still the doctrine is now well established that sole
negligence of plaintiff may defeat recovery. It
follows that if there be substantial evidence that
a plaintiff's injury be caused by plaintiff's sole
negligence, then defendant is entitled to an instruction submitting the question of sole negligence of plaintiff. Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337
Mo. 1205, 88 S. W. 2d 373. We conclude that the
evidence given by the defendant in this case justifies the giving of instruction F.
''As to instruction No. 1, the same conforms
in substance to instructions that have been approved. However, as the question of sole negligence is involved in this case, we conclude that
the instruction presents reversible error in that
it permits the jury to find for plaintiff regardless of the fact of whether or not her negligence
was the sole cause of her injury. Instruction No.
1, we conclude, is in error, also, for the reason
that it is in conflict with a proper instruction
given on behalf of defendant."
Other cases where it has been held that instructions
were conflicting and therefore prejudicial are herein
cited for the convenience of the court: Westberg v.
Willde (Cal.) 85 P. (2d) 507; Morrison v. Perry (Utah,
1943) 140 P. (2d) 772; Alcamisi v. Market St. Ry. Co.,
67 Cal. App. 710, 228 P. 410; Hageman v. Arnold (Mont.)
254 P. 1070; Skelton v. Great Northern Ry Co., (Mont.)
100 P. (2d) 929.
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We recogmze the doctrine that the instructions as
given by the court are to be considered and read as a
whole. However, where two instructions are apparently
conflicting and are not related one to the other by reference, as in the case at bar, what was said in the case
of John O'Brien Boiler Works Co. v. Sievert et al, 266
S. W. 555, 557 is clearly applicable.

" * * * The plaintiff's instruction declares one
rule of law and exacts a verdict upon it; the defendant's instruction declares a different rule
of law squarely in conflict with that declared in
plaintiff's instruction, and exacts a verdict upon
it. The conflict arises upon the essentials of
plaintiff's cause of action. The instruction given
for plaintiff erroneously declares the law of
plaintiff's case, and is so drawn as to exclude
elements essential to the recovery the instruction exacts. Such an instruction is not, and cannot be, cured of its infirmity by an instruction
given for defendant correctly declaring the law."
CONCLUSION
We submit in conclusion that Lloyd C. Andersen
was entitled to have the issue of last clear chance clearly
and correctly submitted to the jury.
His negligence, if any, was that of inattention and
oblivion to approaching danger. This negligence coincided in point of time with that of the defendant in maintaining unsafe and inadequate braking equipment on
its train, but was on a different level. See Graharn case.
~ ...,....., _..,..,_..~, •.,..~···..,,~. . .·~~·~~-·-,.;........-.....,. _ __....!,..
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'rhe Court's Instructions ~ o. 11 and No. 15 placed
squarely before the jury the proposition that plaintiff's
contributory negligence would preclude his recovery. In
neither instruction was mention made of the doctrine
of last clear chance. Even though the jury believed that
had the train's brakes operated properly the accident
could clearly have been avoided, under Instructions No.
11 and No. 15 they were directed to return a verdict
against plaintiff if he was himself negligent.
The instructions on last clear chance and contributory negligence were clearly contradictory and conflicting and the entire doctrine of last clear chance was
thereby annulled, wiped out and destroyed.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that this case,
should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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